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Assessing risk in dynamic situations: lessons from fire service operations. 
 
Abstract 
Fire Service personnel face risk on a daily basis and frequently work in extremely 
dangerous conditions – and the severity of the danger faced can fluctuate rapidly. The 
Fire Service has therefore become extremely experienced at managing dynamic risks. 
The aim of this article is to review techniques used in the UK fire service to attenuate 
the effects of risk and to discuss these with respect to organisations which experience 
dynamic risk in other fields – even if in less dramatic conditions. 
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Statistically the UK Fire Service incurs operational fatalities at an average of about 
one fire fighter a year (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2004) which, given the 
inherent dangers of fire operations, frequency of exposure to risky situations and a fire 
fighter population of 50,000 would indicate that risk is generally managed well in this 
domain. Other researchers have begun to demonstrate links between the management 
structures employed by US fire departments at emergencies and those which could be 
used by businesses facing the rapid changes characteristic of today’s commercial 
environment (Bigley & Roberts, 2001). The aim of this paper to show how UK fire 
brigades have developed risk management systems which enable them to operate 
safely in inherently dangerous and unpredictable environments and then to derive 
lessons for  managers in other fields of work that require dynamic risk management. . 
To illustrate the nature of risk experienced in this environment, an example is given in 
Example 1.  
Example 1 – fire in a terraced house 
(This example is taken from HSE (1997) contextualised by interviews 
carried out by the first author with a number of fire officers at the Fire 
Service College.) 
A fire was reported at a terraced house in a small town and Fire Control 
initially dispatched one fire engine to the scene. This would be their 
normal procedure since the houses in this area are very small – sometimes 
called ‘two up two down’ - and the equipment and personnel carried on a 
single fire engine could be expected to deal with the incident. In fact it 
was regarded as inconceivable that more resources would be required 
because it would be difficult to physically accommodate any more than 
one pair of fire fighters in their equipment inside the house. Fire fighters 
never really know what to expect on arrival at the scene of an incident, but 
in this case they would have been confident that even the worst case 
scenario in this type of property would be a fire which would be 
extinguished with ease. On arrival, the fire fighters were confronted by a 






building which was well alight and completely smoke logged. Two fire 
fighters had already rigged themselves with breathing apparatus on the 
short drive to the house and, as soon as they arrived, they dashed into the 
house. At once they found a child in the upstairs bedroom who they 
carried downstairs, out of the house and laid her on the ground outside. 
Without stopping, they turned and went back into the house to search for 
another child. They had only just got inside the front door when they were 
caught in an explosion known as a backdraught. The force of the 
explosion caused the front door - the only means of escape - to slam shut 
and then become jammed preventing the rescue of the fire fighters caught 
on the fire side of the door. Later it was calculated that the backdraught 
occurred than three minutes after the arrival at the scene. Both fire fighters 
and the child they had rescued, died. 
 
A building on fire could never be said to be a safe place, but this situation seemed at 
the time to present a very limited risk to the fire fighters. They were equipped with 
breathing apparatus, fire resistant clothing and had carried hose-lines into the house. 
Tackling house fires, if not an everyday occurrence, is certainly one which is regularly 
trained for and would be considered at the centre of the role of the fire service. The 
backdraught had simply not been foreseen in these circumstances – in other words had 
not been perceived as a potential risk. The risk encountered was extremely dynamic as 
the incident - and associated dangers - unfolded rapidly, dramatically and with 
devastating consequences.  
 
This incident in 1996 came as a great shock to the fire community and has been 
influential in bringing about a change of thinking about risk and training and has 
meant that risk became a more explicit theme of fire service thinking. The central 
guidance on fire service operations is based on the Safe Person Concept (Home 
Office, 1997), which recommended that all fire service operations should be based on 






assessments of risk to personnel as the central factor. This has led to risk featuring 
prominently in operational training and fire officers becoming well versed in the 
language of risk. The official publication on incident command for UK fire brigades 
states that: 
'All activities should be conducted so as to minimise the risks to operational personnel 
and the public. All tactical and operational deployments must be based on a risk 
assessment. Where a significant risk (e.g. a chemical hazard or a dangerous structure) 
is identified steps must be taken to manage that risk though the application of pre-
planned standard operating procedures’ (HM Fire Service Inspectorate, 1999b, p. 34).  
 
The guidance also states that one of the key command competences applicable to all 
fireground roles is that of ‘risk assessment’ (ibid, p. 38). Finally, the central part of 
risk assessment in the process of risk management is officially laid out: ‘Risk 
assessment is a powerful tool for informing, but not dictating, decisions on the 
management of risk’. (HMSO, 1996, p. v). The implication is, that a fire commander 
having assessed that a particular course of action may involve exposure to risk, would 
not necessarily abandon a given course of action. As in many other industrial settings, 
some level of risk is accepted and has to be managed. Indeed, as will be seen later in 
this paper, more recent guidance specifically encourages controlled, deliberate risk 
taking in certain circumstances. However, before reviewing the ways in which 
dynamic risk is managed in the fire service, we shall first explore how the fire service 
uses formal risk assessments to inform dynamic risk assessment. 
 






Longer term approaches to risk management in the Fire Service 
Formal risk assessments are carried out by fire brigades on a regular basis as 
illustrated by Example 2. 
Example 2 – long term risk management 
A fire station has a chemicals factory on its ‘patch’. Fire Crews ensure 
that they are familiar with its layout and have knowledge about the 
chemicals used and the processes that are carried out there. Regular 
contact with the site keeps the fire crews informed of any changes at the 
factory – new plant or processes. This information is recorded and carried 
on the fire appliances (fire engines) so that in the event of a fire at this 
factory, the crews will have access to risk information which will inform 
the risk assessment of the officer in command. On a higher level, the 
brigade monitors building development to assess whether demographic 
shifts have brought about alterations to the nature and level of risk in a 
particular area so it can determine whether levels of cover were 
appropriate. This type of risk assessment is not dynamic since it only 
changes over a period of years and feeds into long term planning in terms 
of the number and staffing of fire stations and their locations. The 
difficulties posed by this type of risk assessment are to be found in the 
political implications of changes to fire cover which have played some 
part in the recent industrial dispute in the UK Fire Service. 
 
Thus, in the event of an incident occurring at this particular plant, a dynamic risk 
assessment will be carried out which would be informed by knowledge of the formal 
risk assessment. Further long term approaches to risk are made by the continued study 
of fire behaviour and, with advances in understanding about the nature of fire, more 
informed assessment of risk posed by fire can be made (e.g. Grimwood, 1992; HM 
Fire Services Inspectorate, 1999a). This general knowledge about fire behaviour and 
specific information about the risks posed by specific buildings impacts on dynamic 
risk assessments made at fire incidents since this type of knowledge will reduce 
uncertainty and assists with the management of the dynamic risks experienced by the 
operational command commander.  






The link between uncertainty and risk 
In Example 1, if the personnel concerned had been aware that backdraught conditions 
existed, they could have taken actions to prevent it happening. However, in practice it 
is impossible to eliminate uncertainty in fire operations. The investigation of a major 
fire at Kings Cross station in London (Fennel, 1988) directed the extensive resources 
of a full Public Enquiry into constructing a veridical account of events. In the report, it 
is acknowledged that several major anomalies about what actually happened remained 
even with this level of post-event data collection and analysis. In this incident, 
uncertainty contributed considerably to the level of complexity in managing the 
incident but since even a full Public Enquiry could not completely establish the facts, 
it is improbable that this would have been possible during the incident. In order to 
attenuate some of the effects of uncertainty, the fire service is able to take some steps 
to reducing uncertainty through formal risk assessment and planning which is 
illustrated in example 2 above  
 
The type of intelligence gathering described in example 2 which occurs throughout 
the fire service is without doubt a valuable contribution to the management of risk. 
This approach is commonly found in other professions where formal risk assessments 
are carried out on equipment and working methods (see Fay & Tissington, 2004, for a 
review of theory and practise in this are). Notwithstanding the importance of these 
risk assessments, they suffer from two major limitations. First, it is unlikely that 
incidents will unfold in exactly the way foreseen in risk assessments and therefore 
control measures put in place at an incident as a result of risk assessment may be 






inappropriate. Second, there is a danger that formal risk assessment might be regarded 
by fire fighters as an irritating encumbrance rather than as a way of preparing for 
incidents. Therefore the risk assessment may not be carried out thoroughly or kept up 
to date.  
 
The remainder of this article will focus on dynamic risk as experienced and managed 
by the officer at the scene of an incident as this type of event has parallels to other 
situations where an individual is required to make on the spot decisions based on the 
management of risk in a rapidly changing situation. For example, acute medical teams 
(surgery, accident and emergency) regularly deal with patients with uncertain 
diagnoses and/ or rapidly changing conditions (Flin & Maran, in press); airline pilots 
may have to make rapid decisions when faced with a changing  demands (Orasanu & 
Fisher, 1997), managers in industry may have to make production or safety decisions 
against a backdrop of fluctuating risks from production and economic conditions 
(Muhlemann et al, 1992). 
 
Perhaps the most significant recent innovation in the management of risk at UK fire 
incidents has been the adoption of a model of Dynamic Risk Assessment which has 
features which could counter some of these drawbacks in that it institutionalises the 
concept of dynamic risk, differentiating this conceptually from the static type of risk 
which can be accurately calculated at leisure. This model and its role in risk 
management are now reviewed. 






Model of Dynamic Risk Assessment 
Fire officers are taught to operate a process of Dynamic Risk Assessment (HM Fire 
Service Inspectorate, 1999b) whereby the risks they encounter must be continually 
assessed as the incident progresses. The process requires officers to carry out the 
following:  
(1) Evaluate the situation, tasks and persons at risk; (2) select systems of work; (3) 
assess the chosen systems of work; (4) introduce additional controls if necessary; (5) 
re-assess systems of work and additional control measures. These elements are now 
described: 
Evaluate the situation, tasks and persons at risk 
This is the information gathering phase where an appraisal is made of what is 
happening and therefore what needs to be done. This leads to a view being formed of 
who is at risk and what these risks might be. The process whereby these conclusions 
are reached is via ‘…professional judgement’ (ibid) which is the result of direct 
experience of similar or analogous incidents or by means of indirect experience 
achieved through training and discussions with peers. In general terms, the need to 
make rapid assessments of a dynamic, hazardous situation is essential for a number of 
other professionals e.g. police, paramedics, pilots, surgeons. This element equates to 
the concept of Situation Awareness (SA) initially developed in aviation (e.g. Endsley, 
1995) where the flight crew’s understanding of the situation and how it might develop 
have been shown to be directly linked to their ability to make the right decisions. SA 
has been found to be trainable and translatable to other domains (e.g. Banbury & 
Tremblay, 2004) and might be argued to be something the fire service has known 






about for some time (albeit with less formal reference to the concept of risk) in the 
concept of ‘size up’ where the duty of the officer in command was described in terms 
of sizing up the situation and issuing the necessary orders (Home Office, 1981). More 
recent fire publications have included this concept (e.g. HM Fire Services 
Inspectorate, 1999b) and recent research into operational decision making has found 
SA at the centre of the decision making process (Tissington,  2004a) and to a degree 
in organisations  termed ‘High Reliability Industries’ (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) 
Select systems of work/Assess systems of work 
There are certain standard procedures for working at incidents which are a 
combination of technical procedures (e.g. number of personnel required to lift a piece 
of equipment) and normal ways of working (e.g. splitting crews between the front and 
back of a building). The assessment is whether the standard ways of working will 
achieve the objectives in hand and whether they will be safe in the particular 
circumstances of the specific incident. The strength of this assessment is that it 
acknowledges that the safety of a particular way of working is dependent on the 
current environmental context. This encourages the experienced fire officer to take a 
flexible approach to procedures depending on circumstances and to use his or her 
professional experience to assess the situation, possible ways of working, and 
standard procedures to make decisions about risk taking. The experience of the 
decision maker is a critical difference between the UK fire service and other 
occupations. A key feature of the UK fire service is that all officers enter the service 
at ‘Fire Fighter’ rank and, whilst there may be drawbacks to this single tier entry 






system, its strength is that all officers have gained considerable experience before they 
are expected to command incidents. This is in contrast to, for example, the British 
Army where young officers with very limited experience are placed in authority over 
soldiers and Non Commissioned Officers who may have a great deal of experience. 
This results in a curious game playing for the early career of the young officer where 
they are essentially ‘carried’ by their soldiers. In these circumstances, it is unlikely 
that the officer is able to bring experience to bear in the way the UK fire service does 
– except in that the officer may defer to others who may have that experience for 
advice. This carries over to other occupations where for various reasons experience of 
dealing with dynamic high stakes risk is not acquired through experience. In these 
circumstances, the need for training and exercising is more pronounced than where 
expertise can be acquired over a long period of time. 
Are the risks proportional to the benefits? 
This stage of the model introduces a control on fire fighters who may in the heat of 
the moment become inclined to place themselves at risk needlessly. It is 
acknowledged that it may be necessary to take some risks if lives are in danger. The 
following heuristic has been offered as a structure for this assessment: 
'Firefighters will take some risk to save saveable lives. 
Firefighters will take a little risk to save saveable property 
Firefighters will not take any risk at all to try to save lives or property that are already 
lost.' HM Fire Services Inspectorate, 1999b, p. 30. 
 






The levels of risk are defined here as being ‘some’, ‘a little’ and ‘no risk at all’. These 
quantities may be unsatisfactory to the empiricist, but are a useable framework for the 
operational fire commander. Clearly it is possible for the officer at the incident to pose 
the questions ‘does this way of working pose some risk to personnel?’ and ‘would I be 
able to save any saveable lives with this way of working?’. The answers to these 
questions provide a clear answer to whether to proceed or not. This element of the 
model provides a pragmatic basis for checking excessive risk taking behaviour – 
historically regarded as a problem in the fire service. There is naturally a degree of 
subjectivity about this since the two factors are the nature of the situation and the 
interpretation placed upon it by the individual officer. However, the literature in the 
field of dynamic, high stakes decisions tells us that fire officers' decisions are made on 
the basis of expertise rather than the application of formal written procedures 
(Tissington, 2004b) and by its very nature this is unique to each individual fire officer 
and is accrued through direct experience of incidents reinforced by training and 
informal discussion of incidents with peers. Accordingly a heuristic of this type – 
offering broad indications as to the acceptableness of taking risk – is relevant and 
valuable to the fire officer. 
 
So, the benefits referred to in the model are concerned with saving life and the 
preservation of property. If neither of these outcomes is probable, the emphasis is on 
safe ways of working. The precise level of risk which can be taken is not specified in 
the model which is consistent with the enormous range of situations the model is 
designed to apply to and therefore remains a matter of judgement of the individual 






Incident Commander. The guidance would suggest that the first assessment is to the 
outcome of the candidate course of action – ‘if we do this, will we save the 
life/property’ – and the second to the level of risk to which personnel would be 
exposed.   
Can additional control measures be introduced? 
This is a checking loop where any possible additional safety systems can be 
introduced. This is not strictly control of risk as it would tend to be the addition of 
protective equipment or personnel with a view to protecting the safety of personnel 
rather than preventing the risky occurrence.   
 
The concept of this model is to offer a structure by which the quality of dynamic risk 
assessment can be evaluated. It is not offered as a set of rules which commanders 
must follow nor even is it designed as an aide memoire such as might be kept in a 
pocket for quick reference. With the time frames available - especially in the early 
stages of incidents – it seems unlikely that there would be sufficient time to carry out 
a deliberate risk assessment and certainly not enough time to write down the answers 
to a series of questions posed. The model is therefore a descriptive one and shows the 
sequence of carrying out a risk assessment in a simple format. It informs the design of 
training in risk management throughout the fire service and might be used as the focus 
for debriefs after training sessions or after-action reviews of real incidents. It therefore 
has its limitations, and is not of itself intended as the sole basis for safety at fire 
incidents. Even allowing for this, it is possible to criticise the model. 







Critical evaluation of the model 
Perhaps the most serious area of criticism of this model - or indeed any other 
description of risk assessment as a clear step by step process - is that dynamic risk 
assessment is inextricably linked with decision making, with risk assessment forming 
a key component of decision making (Tissington, 2004a). The literature on decision 
making in this type of environment shows that decisions tend not to follow a neat 
sequential procedure but to be characterised by apparently instinctive experience 
driven responses to the situation as it unfolds. Decision making research also shows 
that if a deliberate process of risk assessment were to be imposed, there would be a 
low take up rate in practice by fire officers (Samurçay & Rogalski, 1988). Finally, the 
model is the product of the expert view of a small number of fire officers which, given 
the expert nature of risk assessment, is on the face of it appropriate. However, no 
replicable methodology is reported for the origination of the model nor has it (to date) 
been tested empirically.  
 
Despite the criticisms discussed above, the Model of Dynamic Risk Assessment has 
proved of value in promoting thinking about dynamic risk in the fire community and, 
whilst it has empirical limitations, the linkage between risk and decision making 
means that there is raised awareness of the cognitive processes involved in assessing 
risk in the environments experienced by fire commanders operationally. The model 
certainly offers a basis for learning and a structure for the debriefing of incidents and 
exercises where there is now a common language of risk. This is a key way in which 






other occupations can benefit from the experience of the fire service in adopting the 
model as a structure for debrief and learning.  
 
Transfer outside the fire domain 
This paper has set out the ways in which the fire service works to a set of heuristic 
principles concerning the circumstances and amount of risk which should be taken 
and how it has a model of risk assessment which informs training in risk assessment. 
So, how can this be applied elsewhere? With dynamic risk situations, and the 
experience of the fire service is that the prescriptive approach is not necessarily the 
most effective. Risk is now an intrinsic part of the way fire commanders organise their 
crews at emergency incidents and as such could be said to be part of the 
organisational culture – ‘the way we do things round here’. Much has been written 
about safety culture but the inclusion of risk in everyday decision making as shown in 
the fire service is a concept that organisations in other fields could benefit from. The 
model could be used as a structure and prompt for reflection during a work task on the 
situation evaluation, whether the systems of work selected were still safe, whether 
additional control measures could be introduced and whether these factors were 
reflected on during the incident. In many work domains, careful pre-job risk 
assessment is carried out which covers many if not all these factors but frequently the 
process is not continued once the task has started and the conditions begin to change.  
The real lesson of risk management in the fire service is that the management of risk 
needs to be something which is carried out instinctively during the task rather than 
being a formal procedure, completed before the task begins. This means that risk is 






managed in these environments by experienced individuals drawing on their expertise  
to make judgements as the situation unfolds dynamically and this expertise is 
accumulated over a long period of time through direct experience or simulation of a 
range of situations. The model of dynamic risk assessment can be used as the basis for 
analysis and debrief to enhance the experience base. When situations arise and 
experience based decisions made ‘for real’, training based on the model will enable 
the construction of richer experience base. Application of this expertise happens very 
quickly and is often reported as being instinctive or on the basis of ‘gut feel’. In order 
to gain this experience, organisations should actively train personnel in the 
management of risk through risk simulations and controlled exposure to domain 
relevant hazards. 
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